Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies
Volume 13

Article 10

1-1-2004

Justice Defiled: Perverts, Potheads, Serial Killers and Lawyers
Michael Spratt
Emilie Taman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 3.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Michael Spratt & Emilie Taman, "Justice Defiled: Perverts, Potheads, Serial Killers and Lawyers" (2004) 13
Dal J Leg Stud 263.

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For
more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

JUSTICE DEFILED . . . 263

BOOK	

    REVIEWS

Justice Deﬁled: Perverts, Potheads, Serial Killers and
Lawyers
Alan Young
Toronto: Key Porter Books Ltd, 2003 (337 pp.)

Reviewed by Michael Spratt† and Emilie Taman‡

I. INTRODUCTION
Alan Youngʼ’s Justice Deﬁled: Perverts, Potheads, Serial Killers and
Lawyers is a self-styled celebration of legal vulgarity.1 In keeping with
this theme, Young rejects conventional academic discourse, preferring
instead the use of profane and often shocking language to convey his
disgust with the state of the criminal law. Youngʼ’s use of language is
not troubling in principle; to the contrary, the vulgarity of his language
might have served to complement an otherwise persuasive argument.
Unfortunately, however, many of Youngʼ’s arguments fall ﬂat because
they are not situated in a constructive analytical framework.
Young explores two general themes in Justice Deﬁled, although a
traditional thesis is more difﬁcult to identify. He contends ﬁrstly that
consensual acts which are harmless to everyone but the actor should not
be prohibited by the criminal law. His secondary theme is that lawyers
are part of a fundamentally ﬂawed oligarchy whose self-interest drives
them to perpetuate the status quo. The absence of a deﬁned thesis results
in a series of disjointed criticisms of the legal profession lacking the
†

Michael Spratt is a third year law student at Dalhousie University. In light of his interest in
criminal law, he will be articling with a criminal defence ﬁrm in Toronto next year.
‡
Emilie Taman is also in third year law at Dalhousie Law School. She will be clerking with the
Ontario Court of Appeal next year.
1
A. Young, Justice Deﬁled: Perverts, Potheads, Serial Killers and Lawyers, (Toronto: Key
Porter Books Ltd., 2003).

264 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

necessary academic stamina needed to act as an effective impetus for
institutional reform.
The timing of this review is fortuitous as it coincides with the release of the Supreme Court of Canadaʼ’s decision in R. v. Malmo-Levine.2
This case raised one of the two issues that troubles Young: the criminal
prohibition of activities that cause no harm to the actor, an identiﬁable
victim, or society at large.3 The majority decision and the main dissent
by Justice Arbour explore whether there is a “harm principle,” based on
the theories of John Stuart Mill, which underlies the criminal law. The
majority rejects the argument that harm, as a pre-requisite to criminal
sanction, is a legal principle so fundamental to our notion of justice as to
enjoy the constitutional protection of section 7 of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.4 However, the majority nonetheless accepts that there
is a legitimate State interest in prohibiting only those acts that cause
harm to others. Justice Arbour, on the other hand, argues that where an
offence carries with it the possibility of imprisonment, section 7 of the
Charter will be unjustiﬁably infringed where it cannot be demonstrated
that the prohibited act causes harm.
While Young argues that only truly harmful acts should be prohibited, he does not explore the idea that harm may be a constitutional
prerequisite to criminal sanction. Indeed, there is no cogent legal theory
forming the basis of his argument which could reﬂect, at least in part,
his disdain for the law. Instead of using harm or some other principle
to argue that the State cannot legislate with respect to certain harmless crimes, Young often slips into highly emotional and reactionary
arguments as to why the State should not criminalize harmless moral
choices. These arguments, although thought-provoking, do not provide
the “conventionally moral” reader with a sound legal justiﬁcation for
why others should be able to make such choices without engaging the
criminal law.
Young characterizes Justice Deﬁled as an attack on the legal profession – a profession which is, in his view, largely hypocritical, corrupt
and apathetic. He blames the lawyers for perpetuating the status quo by
blindly applying laws they know to be unfair or which they choose not
2
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to follow in their own lives. Why he blames the profession exclusively,
and not Parliament, for the existence of so many “morally hygienic”
crimes is unclear. Some incarnation of the harm principle, as discussed
in Malmo-Levine, would have provided Young with a more constructive vehicle to promote the changes to the justice system he believes
are necessary. The use of a principled argument may not be the most
shocking or awe-inspiring impetus for reform, but it does stand up to
academic scrutiny in a way that Justice Deﬁled–though passionate and
ambitious–does not.

II. JUSTICE DEFILED
Justice Deﬁled is divided into four parts. In the ﬁrst, “Entering the Arena,” Young explores his conclusion that the legal profession is a social
cancer. The second part, “Sex, Drugs and the Illegality of Paradise,”
examines how the criminal justice system wastes time combating consensual lifestyle decisions that do not threaten the fabric of society. In
the third part, “Victims, Violence and the Beast,” Young submits that
the lawʼ’s preoccupation with moral hygiene and other trivialities has
left the criminal justice system ill-equipped to deal with serious issues
of violence and exploitation. Finally, in “Legal Professionals as Fallen
Priests,” Young attempts to show that the nature of an adversarial legal
culture breeds arrogance, elitism and a captious spirit.

III. ENTERING THE ARENA
This ﬁrst part of Justice Deﬁled lays out Youngʼ’s contention that lawyers are a cancer. As law students, the authors of this review are nearing
the completion of what Young would refer to as our transformation into
a privileged and oppressive class. In casting lawyers as a cancer, blindly
applying oppressive laws, Young writes: “I donʼ’t need a control group
to show that most law students are in it for the money. I see it in their
eyes,” and “the ʻ‘law as oppressionʼ’ rant is so well known I donʼ’t have
the academic strength to recount it.”5 These statements illustrate a major
5
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ﬂaw that permeates much of Youngʼ’s analysis: lack of authority. One
does not need to be a member of a privileged group to understand that
broad, sweeping statements of fact should not be made authoritatively
in the absence of some form of substantiation.
Nonetheless, buried in the rhetoric that permeates this section is a
grain of academic gold, a statement that if expanded upon could have
provided the analytical framework Justice Deﬁled is in desperate need
of. This is Youngʼ’s statement that the criminal law should only target
behaviour that is harmful to others.6 This statement, however, is made
somewhat in passing, and is not elaborated or drawn on as a legal justiﬁcation for the decriminalization of certain crimes.
Young begins the second chapter of this section with an anecdote
about a sexually frustrated man named Homer and his quest for sexual
gratiﬁcation that falls short of actual intercourse. Young uses this as an
example of the criminal lawʼ’s misuse of resources combating social issues that are not inherently “criminal.” In other words, the criminal law
should only be engaged, in Youngʼ’s view, to regulate activity that causes
harm to third parties or society at large. Young contends that prostitution
and escort laws target behaviour that does not harm anyone, and that
the current criminal law sanctions amount to little more than a licensing fee. While Young acknowledges that women who are coerced into
prostitution through physical abuse or who enter the trade to fuel drug
addiction are harmed, he contends that these harms are consequent to
the criminalization of the sex trade.
This statement is an example of Youngʼ’s typical response to the contrary argument that the trade in drugs and sex and other so-called moral
crimes are inherently harmful. Young may be right that the effect of
criminalization is often the transformation of otherwise harmless activities into dangerous ones–this premise is certainly worth exploring–but
little analysis of any kind is provided on the issue. Further, Young is
often quick to point out ﬂaws in the criminal justice system while offering few solutions. He often argues that offences should be taken out
of the Criminal Code while simultaneously recognizing that an alternative form of non-criminal regulation may be justiﬁed. Justice Deﬁled
does not provide an exit strategy or alternative regulation mechanism to

6
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replace the present regime of criminalization. Without a coherent exit
strategy, the removal of “harmless” activities from the Criminal Code
may, in fact, cause more harm than good in the short term.
In the ﬁnal chapter of Part I, the reader is subjected to the ﬁrst of
Youngʼ’s disjointed musings about the criminal justice system. His main
criticism in this chapter is that the criminal law is too concerned with
what he calls the “where, what, who and when” aspects of crime, but
not the “why.” Young uses the extreme example of murderer and serialrapist Paul Bernardo to illustrate this point. He argues that millions of
dollars were wasted in the Bernardo trial to prove something we already
knew: that Bernardo was guilty.7 Young suggests that the money spent
on Bernardoʼ’s trial could have been better spent seeking to understand
why Bernardo had committed such horrible crimes. On the facts of the
Bernardo case, where the Crown had videotapes depicting Mr. Bernardo
committing the offences, it is possible to see how a reader would agree
that resources were wasted. However, would the alternative be any
more compelling? It is unlikely that Young would advocate for a system
providing for the discretionary denial of trials where the Crown or the
police believed that a trial is unwarranted. Young does not include the
section on Bernardo to demonstrate a need for criminal justice reform
but rather to advance his “lawyers are scum” position. He concludes
the section by arguing that the only people who beneﬁted from the Bernardo trial were the lawyers. Contrary to what the section on Bernardo
suggests, a fair trial and the legitimacy it brings to the system beneﬁts
all accused persons and the entire criminal justice process. This is true
even where the accusedʼ’s guilt is near certain.

IV. SEX, DRUGS AND THE ILLEGALITY OF PARADISE
In this second part of Justice Deﬁled, Young argues for the decriminalization of a number of speciﬁc offences that he views as harmless. He
considers such offences to be within the range of reasonable consensual
lifestyle choices that should be available to Canadians. In particular,
Young is critical of sex-trade laws and the prohibitions against the purchase and sale of drugs such as marijuana and heroin.
7	
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With respect to crimes of a sexual nature, Young sees consent as
the only legitimate limiting factor. He argues that adults should be legally permitted to consent to whatever sexual activity they choose, in
the place and under the circumstances they desire, and with the partner
or partners of their choice.8 This is not an unreasonable position to take.
Indeed, Young is not the ﬁrst to argue that “the State has no place in the
bedrooms of the nation.”9 However, he takes a very superﬁcial view of
consent in advancing his position that only a minute number of sexbased crimes are the legitimate subjects of the criminal law. A more
in-depth analysis of the relationship between consent and lack of harm
would better serve to situate this valuable section in a larger analytical
framework, providing both legitimacy and academic fortitude to this
otherwise important argument.
Despite the shortcomings of the chapter dedicated to sex-trade laws,
Young moves on to provide signiﬁcant empirical evidence in support of
his view that marijuana is harmless to both its users and society at large.
With respect to marijuana use, some of the evidence upon which he
relies was accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Clay,10 the
companion case to Malmo-Levine, with which Mr. Young was involved.
However, Youngʼ’s tendency to overreach is once again exposed in this
section.
After having built a solid evidentiary foundation with respect to
marijuana use, Young goes on to make the bald and unsupported assertion that heroin is as harmless as marijuana if used with care, planning
and prudence, and that in most case quitting cold-turkey is no worse
than getting the ﬂu. Young presents very little evidence to this effect, but
indicates that “studies abound” providing the relative numbers of individuals who are likely to be overwhelmed by their given vice. He states
he is unaware of “any study indicating that more than twenty percent of
users or participants in any vice activity lose control over their lives.”11
On that basis he concludes that no more than twenty percent of heroin
8
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users are at risk of causing harm to others. This is an absurd inference,
and even if it were legitimate, a one in ﬁve chance of harm is hardly
insigniﬁcant. Further, Young does not address the fact that heroin is addictive and that this will often negate the planning and prudence which
he insists will usually curtail the potentially harmful effects of its use.
In Youngʼ’s desire to be sensational, a legitimate legal argument for the
decriminalization of marijuana is grossly undermined by his unreasoned
claims about heroin.
Young draws on his earlier arguments about the hypocrisy of lawyers by alluding to the number of practicing lawyers who use drugs
themselves. This is another example of an argument that may evoke the
kind of response Young seems to crave, but it does little to advance any
meaningful thesis. If criminal defence lawyers represented only those
defendants with whom they morally agreed, or if prosecutors refused
to enforce laws with which they disagreed, the criminal justice system
would become unworkable.
Young goes on to make an interesting point about the exorbitant
economic cost of enforcing laws that prohibit harmless acts. Even discounting the more controversial activities such as heroin-use, the prosecution of offences relating to harmless acts such as consensual sex or
marijuana-use consumes vast quantities of resources. Young argues that
the police suffer from a ﬁnancial and public relations addiction to the
enforcement of marijuana laws. Unfortunately, this intriguing theory,
like Youngʼ’s arguments about the decriminalization of marijuana, is at
risk of being lost in a sea of rhetoric. Young should have devoted more
time to the more weighty arguments laid out in this part of Justice Deﬁled before moving on to the third part, where he again deviates from
the harm principle and returns to an unfocused critique of the criminal
justice system.

V. VICTIMS, VIOLENCE AND THE BEAST
Here Young takes a shotgun approach to the critique of current criminal
law policy. First he explores the reasons why we punish. Young examines the deontological and utilitarian approaches to punishment, viewing the criminal law as a form of social contract between society and
the State, and questions the utility of punishing individuals who have
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derived little personal beneﬁt from the criminal law. He questions, for
example, the justice in convicting an individual of assault who has endured a lifetime of abuse. Again however, Young offers little in the way
of answers or solutions .
Young then takes on the verbosity of the Criminal Code.12 He rightly points out that the Code is confusing, repetitive and ambiguous. No
doubt, the removal of the numerous incarnations of the crime of theft,13
for example, would make the Criminal Code more accessible to Canadians. Furthermore, the removal of offences that cause no harm to others
would make the Code fairer. However, rather than rooting his concerns
about the Code in notions such as accessibility or justice, Young reverts
to sensationalism, suggesting that it is ambiguous because ambiguity
leads to inﬂated proﬁts for lawyers. This might appeal to an already
jaded public, but it does little to advance a persuasive justiﬁcation for
legal reform.
Young then revisits his earlier argument that the decriminalization of
harmless offences would save the justice system money and free up resources that could be directed toward truly harmful acts. This argument
is appealing on its face, and we agree that reform in this area is needed.
Young does not, however, address the cost of delegating these harmless offences to a regulatory board or tribunal. It is quite possible that
a parallel but non-criminal regulatory scheme would be equally costly.
The criticism of crimes on the basis of their economic cost is likely to
have wide-spread appeal. Yet given that it is not clear that the alternative would be any more cost-effective, by rooting this argument in an
analytical concept, such as harm, Young could have made an equally
compelling argument on the basis of social rather than economic costs.

VI. LEGAL PROFESSIONALS AS FALLEN PRIESTS
In this ﬁnal part of Justice Deﬁled, Young abandons completely the idea
of harm and reverts back to an attack on the legal profession as a whole.
The closing chapters of the book focus mainly on legal education and
the nature of the adversarial system. This part appears to be a popu12

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [the “Code”].
See e.g. Criminal Code, ibid at s. 322 (theft), s. 323 (theft from an oyster bed), s. 338 (theft of
cattle), s. 339 (theft of drift timber).
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larized attack on lawyers, designed to rekindle readersʼ’ enthusiasm in
order to bring them on side as the book comes to a close. As law students, our experience leads us to think that Youngʼ’s criticisms of the legal education system are overly simplistic and often grossly unfair. Pro
bono, legal aid and the promotion of “alternative” careers are a prominent feature of legal education at Dalhousie and many other law schools
across Canada. This may be a reﬂection of student initiative as opposed
to institutional foresight, but the students with whom we have come in
contact are moral, ethical, socially progressive, and lack the adversarial
mean-streak that Young seems to be familiar with.

VII. CONCLUSION
Justice Deﬁled is a timely and interesting general critique of the criminal justice system. Youngʼ’s use of colourful language and personal anecdotes is highly effective at evoking an emotional response from the
reader. With a little more focus and less sensationalism, Youngʼ’s ideas
might have transcended purely emotional responses and given rise to a
persuasive justiﬁcation for reform. Unfortunately, as it stands, Justice
Deﬁled caters more to those who are already of a like mind with the
author. The legal profession in Canada is not bereft of those who would
be amenable to criminal justice reform that could lead to an accessible,
minimally intrusive, just system that Young seeks. Through his choice
of tone and style, however, Young risks undermining the movement for
reform. This book, lacking as it is in academic rigor, may well alienate legal academics and others who are in a position to effect change.
Without the offer of concrete ways to implement the change he seeks,
Youngʼ’s sensationalistic tendencies may simply serve to reinforce the
status quo, rather than bringing us closer to the ideal.

